Actualism, Presentism and the Grounding Objection

  title={Actualism, Presentism and the Grounding Objection},
  author={Nina Emery},
  • Nina Emery
  • Published 6 June 2018
  • Philosophy
  • Erkenntnis
Presentism is the view that only presently existing things exist. Actualism is the view that only actually existing things exist. Although these views have much in common, the position we take with respect to one of them is not usually thought to constrain the position that we may take toward the other. In this paper I argue that this standard attitude deserves further scrutiny. In particular, I argue that the considerations that motivate one common objection to presentism—the grounding… 
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