Actions and activity

@inproceedings{Hornsby2012ActionsAA,
  title={Actions and activity},
  author={Jennifer L. Hornsby},
  year={2012}
}
Contemporary literature in philosophy of action seems to be divided overthe place of action in the natural causal world. I think that a disagreementabout ontology underlies the division. I argue here that human action isproperly understood only by reference to a category of process or activity,where this is not a category of particulars. 

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