Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections

@article{Przeworski2015AcquiringTH,
  title={Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections},
  author={Adam Przeworski},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  year={2015},
  volume={48},
  pages={101 - 129}
}
  • A. Przeworski
  • Published 1 January 2015
  • Political Science
  • Comparative Political Studies
Changing governments through elections is a rare and a recent practice. Yielding office the first time is foreboding because it entails the risk that the gesture would not be reciprocated, but the habit develops rapidly once the first step is taken. This article provides evidence for these assertions by examining about 3,000 elections in the world since 1788. 

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