Achieving Target Equilibria in Network Routing Games without Knowing the Latency Functions

@article{Bhaskar2014AchievingTE,
  title={Achieving Target Equilibria in Network Routing Games without Knowing the Latency Functions},
  author={Umang Bhaskar and Katrina Ligett and Leonard J. Schulman and Chaitanya Swamy},
  journal={2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science},
  year={2014},
  pages={31-40}
}
The analysis of network routing games typically assumes, right at the onset, precise and detailed information about the latency functions. Such information may, however, be unavailable or difficult to obtain. Moreover, one is often primarily interested in enforcing a desirable target flow as the equilibrium by suitably influencing player behavior in the routing game. We ask whether one can achieve target flows as equilibria without knowing the underlying latency functions. Our main result gives… 

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