# Achieving Target Equilibria in Network Routing Games without Knowing the Latency Functions

@article{Bhaskar2014AchievingTE, title={Achieving Target Equilibria in Network Routing Games without Knowing the Latency Functions}, author={Umang Bhaskar and Katrina Ligett and Leonard J. Schulman and Chaitanya Swamy}, journal={2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science}, year={2014}, pages={31-40} }

The analysis of network routing games typically assumes, right at the onset, precise and detailed information about the latency functions. Such information may, however, be unavailable or difficult to obtain. Moreover, one is often primarily interested in enforcing a desirable target flow as the equilibrium by suitably influencing player behavior in the routing game. We ask whether one can achieve target flows as equilibria without knowing the underlying latency functions. Our main result gives…

## 21 Citations

Computing Optimal Tolls in Routing Games without Knowing the Latency Functions

- Computer ScienceArXiv
- 2015

It is shown that in this model, it is impossible to obtain optimal tolls, but if the oracle is augmented so that it returns the total latency of the equilibrium flow induced by the tolls in addition to the flow itself, then the required tolls can be computed with a polynomial number of queries.

Fundamental limits of locally-computed incentives in network routing

- Economics, Computer Science2017 American Control Conference (ACC)
- 2017

It is asked if it is possible to positively influence social behavior with no risk of unintentionally incentivizing pathological behavior, and a type of pathological network in which all locally-computed tolling functions can cause perverse incentives for heterogeneous price-sensitive user populations is exhibited.

Can Taxes Improve Congestion on All Networks?

- EconomicsIEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- 2020

It is shown that if networks are sufficiently complex and populations sufficiently diverse, perverse incentives cannot be systematically avoided: Any taxation mechanism that improves outcomes on one network must necessarily degrade them on another.

Optimal mechanisms for robust coordination in congestion games

- Economics2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
- 2015

This paper studies the application of taxes to a network-routing game, and it is shown that it is possible to design taxes that guarantee that network flows are arbitrarily close to optimal flows, despite the fact that agents' tax-sensitivities are unknown to us.

Avoiding perverse incentives in affine congestion games

- Economics, Computer Science2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
- 2016

It is proved that if some network users are unresponsive to tolls, any taxation mechanism that does not depend on network structure can create perverse incentives, and it is shown that a small amount of additional information can mitigate this negative result.

The Robustness of Marginal-Cost Taxes in Affine Congestion Games

- Computer ScienceIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- 2017

This work presents a simple setting in which scaled marginal-cost tolls can be guaranteed to provide significant efficiency improvements over the un-tolled case, even if the toll-sensitivities of the users are unknown.

Differentiable Equilibrium Computation with Decision Diagrams for Stackelberg Models of Combinatorial Congestion Games

- Computer ScienceNeurIPS
- 2021

This work addresses Stackelberg models of combinatorial congestion games (CCGs) by carefully combining the idea of differentiable optimization and data structures called zero-suppressed binary decision diagrams (ZDDs), which can compactly represent sets of combinatorsial strategies.

Online Constraint Satisfaction via Tolls in MDP Congestion Games

- EconomicsArXiv
- 2019

The existence of an optimal tolling threshold is shown and learning algorithms that can be employed by both the game designer and the players to jointly determine the optimal toll and induced equilibrium are formulated.

Studies on Robust Social Influence Mechanisms: Incentives for Efficient Network Routing in Uncertain Settings

- Computer ScienceIEEE Control Systems
- 2017

In addition to the technical challenges of a socially integrated engineering problem, an engineer may need to consider methods of influencing individual user behavior to effect positive change on aggregate system performance.

Bridging the user equilibrium and the system optimum in static traffic assignment: how the cooperation among drivers can solve the congestion problem in city networks

- Computer ScienceArXiv
- 2021

The survey reviews the state-of-the-art of the approaches for a fair and efficient static traffic assignment in congested road networks and hybridizes the two approaches aiming at bridging users’ fairness to system-wide efficiency.

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