Accuracy and artifact: reexamining the intensity bias in affective forecasting.

  title={Accuracy and artifact: reexamining the intensity bias in affective forecasting.},
  author={Linda J. Levine and Heather C. Lench and Robin L. Kaplan and Martin A. Safer},
  journal={Journal of personality and social psychology},
  volume={103 4},
Research on affective forecasting shows that people have a robust tendency to overestimate the intensity of future emotion. We hypothesized that (a) people can accurately predict the intensity of their feelings about events and (b) a procedural artifact contributes to people's tendency to overestimate the intensity of their feelings in general. People may misinterpret the forecasting question as asking how they will feel about a focal event, but they are later asked to report their feelings in… 
Negative Valence Effect in Affective Forecasting: The Unique Impact of the Valence Among Dispositional and Contextual Factors for Certain Life Events
Decades of research on affective forecasting have shown a persistent intensity bias—a strong tendency by which people overestimate their future hedonic response for positive events and underestimate
Realistic affective forecasting: The role of personality
Three purported personality processes implicated in affective forecasting are suggested, highlighting the importance of individual-differences research in this domain, and calling for more research on realistic affective forecasts.
Predicted and remembered emotion: tomorrow’s vividness trumps yesterday’s accuracy
Findings reveal asymmetries in the phenomenological experience of predicting and remembering emotion and the vividness of predicted emotion serves as a powerful subjective signal of accuracy even when predictions turn out to be wrong.
More intense experiences, less intense forecasts: why people overweight probability specifications in affective forecasts.
It is proposed that affective forecasters overestimate the extent to which experienced hedonic responses to an outcome are influenced by the probability of its occurrence and, as a result, experiencers allocate a larger share of their attention toward the outcome and less to its probability specifications.
Highly accurate prediction of emotions surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001 over 1-, 2-, and 7-year prediction intervals.
The theories of affective forecasting are extended by showing that emotional responses to an event of ongoing national significance can be predicted with high accuracy, and by identifying current and remembered feelings as independent sources of this accuracy.
Affective forecasting: A selective relationship with working memory for emotion.
A reliable and selective relationship between AWM and AF is demonstrated, suggesting that AWM is a separable working memory subsystem and an elemental capacity that contributes to the type of higher-order emotional processes involved in AF.
Like Schrödinger's cat, the impact bias is both dead and alive: reply to Wilson and Gilbert (2013).
It is concluded that the impact bias, which encompasses overestimating the intensity of feelings about events and overestimates theintensity of feelings in general, is both dead and alive.
Looking into the crystal ball of our emotional lives: emotion regulation and the overestimation of future guilt and shame
Findings provide support for the hypothesis that the intensity bias can—at least in part—be explained by the misprediction of future emotion regulation.
Surprisingness and Occupational Engagement Influence Affective Forecasting in Career-Relevant Contexts
People tend to misestimate their future emotions. This phenomenon is thought to be associated with information accessibility. However, few studies have demonstrated the impact of context-specific
Overcorrection for Social-Categorization Information Moderates Impact Bias in Affective Forecasting
Inducing time pressure reduced the extremity of forecasts for group-labeled but not unspecified targets, which suggests that the increased impact bias was due to overcorrection for social-category information, not different intuitive predictions for identified targets.


Affective forecasting: Why can't people predict their emotions?
Two studies explore the frequently reported finding that affective forecasts are too extreme. In the first study, driving test candidates forecast the emotional consequences of failing. Test failers
Intensity Bias in Affective Forecasting: The Role of Temporal Focus
In five studies, university students predicted their affective reactions to a wide variety of positive and negative future events. In Studies 1 to 3, participants also reported the affective
My imagination versus your feelings: can personal affective forecasts be improved by knowing other peoples' emotions?
A proposed remedy for biased affective forecasts is to base judgments on the actual feelings of people (surrogates) currently experiencing the event, rather than using imagination which conjures an
Predicting future affective states: How ease of retrieval and faith in intuition moderate the impact of activated content
Prior research suggests that duration bias—the tendency to overestimate the duration of affective states—is due to individuals' inordinate focus on event-related information. We propose that the
Focalism and the underestimation of future emotion: when it's worse than imagined.
Failing to account for the extent to which context would focus attention on the event led to underestimation of emotional reactions to a negative event.
Affective Forecasting
People base many decisions on affective forecasts, predictions about their emotional reactions to future events. They often display an impact bias, overestimating the intensity and duration of their
Focalism: a source of durability bias in affective forecasting.
Evidence for a distraction interpretation is found, that people who think about future events moderate their forecasts because they believe that these events will reduce thinking about the focal event.
The Accuracy or Inaccuracy of Affective Forecasts Depends on How Accuracy Is Indexed
Affective forecasting—the process in which individuals predict how they will feel at some point in the future—has become a major topic of research interest in social psychology (Kushlev & Dunn,
Cognitive determinants of affective forecasting errors.
Examination of individual differences and contextual variables associated with cognitive processing in affective forecasting for an election showed that the perceived importance of the event and working memory capacity were both associated with an increased impact bias for some participants, whereas retrieval interference had no relationship with bias.