Accountability and Information in Elections

@inproceedings{Ashworth2017AccountabilityAI,
  title={Accountability and Information in Elections},
  author={Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Amanda Friedenberg},
  year={2017}
}
Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability (i.e., providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (i.e., retaining politicians with characteristics voters value). We show that there may be a trade-off between these two channels. Higher levels of effective accountability may hinder the voters’ ability to learn about the politicians. In turn, this may hinder electoral selection and be detrimental to voter… CONTINUE READING

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