Account Management in Proof of Stake Ledgers

  title={Account Management in Proof of Stake Ledgers},
  author={Dimitris Karakostas and Aggelos Kiayias and Mario Larangeira},
  journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
Blockchain protocols based on Proof-of-Stake (PoS) depend—by nature—on the active participation of stakeholders. If users are offline and abstain from the PoS consensus mechanism, the system’s security is at risk, so it is imperative to explore ways to both maximize the level of participation and minimize the effects of non-participation. One such option is stake representation, such that users can delegate their participation rights and, in the process, form “stake pools”. The core idea is… 
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