Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: Established Standards Reconsidered?

@article{Rato2013AbuseOD,
  title={Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: Established Standards Reconsidered?},
  author={Miguel Leal Rato and Nicolas Petit},
  journal={European Competition Journal},
  year={2013},
  volume={9},
  pages={1 - 65}
}
This paper seeks to examine whether the legal standards underpinning the application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) need to be revisited in light of the alleged specificities of “technology-enabled” markets. To this end, the paper is divided in seven parts. Following this short introduction (A), the paper offers first a definition of the very notion of “technology-enabled” markets (B). Then, it questions whether competition agencies should depart… 

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