Abilities to do otherwise

@article{Kittle2015AbilitiesTD,
  title={Abilities to do otherwise},
  author={Simon Kittle},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2015},
  volume={172},
  pages={3017-3035}
}
  • S. Kittle
  • Published 5 February 2015
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
In this paper I argue that there are different ways that an agent may be able to do otherwise and that therefore, when free will is understood as requiring that an agent be able to do otherwise, we face the following question: which way of being able to do otherwise is most relevant to free will? I answer this question by first discussing the nature of intrinsic dispositions and abilities, arguing that for each action type there is a spectrum of intrinsic abilities. I suggest that recognising… 

The ability to do otherwise and the new dispositionalism

ABSTRACT According to the new dispositionalist’s response to the Frankfurt cases, Jones can do otherwise. Black merely masks (or finks) that ability, but does not deprive Jones of it. This suggestion

Does Everyone Think the Ability to do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility?

Christopher Franklin argues that, despite appearances, everyone thinks that the ability to do otherwise is required for free will and moral responsibility. Moreover, he says that the way to decide

On General and Non‐General Abilities

  • S. Kittle
  • Philosophy
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
  • 2022
: I distinguish two ways an ability might be general: (i) an ability might be general in that its possession doesn ’ t entail the possession of an opportunity; (ii) an ability might be general in

Robustness and Up-to-us-ness

Abstract Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some critics have responded by highlighting various

On dispositional masks

Dispositions can be masked: some state of affairs might obtain which would prevent an entity from displaying the manifestation characteristic of its disposition. Yet discussions of masks overlook a

How (not) to think about the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will

ABSTRACT This essay is an investigation into the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will, where free will is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. I argue that van Inwagen's recent

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 18 REFERENCES

Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer

There is one important point about which Fischer and I are in agreement. We agree that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. We disagree about the best way of defending that claim. He

Dispositions and Antidotes

C.B. Martin has shown that the simple conditional analysis of disposition concepts (x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s) is in error. This is due to finkish dispositions which

Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter

CONTENTS Chapter 1 The Problem Introduced: Would Determinism Rob us of Free Will? 1. Free Will, Ability to do Otherwise, and the Basic Argument 2. Determinism and some Distinctions 3. Narrow Ability,

Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction

The central theme of this paper is the dispositional/categorical distinction that has been one of the top agendas in contemporary metaphysics. I will first develop from my semantic account of

Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals

For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of

what is a disposition?

The categorical/dispositional distinction should not be abandoned; it underpins important metaphysical disputes and should be taken as a primitive, after which the doomed attempts at reductive explanation can be transformed into circular but interesting accounts.

What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean

This paper argues for a relative concept of modality underlying modal words like ‘must’ and ‘can’ in natural language and gives preliminary definitions of the meaning of these words which are formulated in terms of logical consequence and compatibility, respectively.

The concept of mind.

  • H. Home
  • Psychology
    The International journal of psycho-analysis
  • 1966
If I notice that babies exposed at all fmri is the steps in jahai to research, and I wonder if you ever studied illness, I reflect only baseline condition they ensure.

Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account