AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ACCOUNTING AND MARKET MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION CONTRACTS

@article{Lambert1987ANAO,
  title={AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ACCOUNTING AND MARKET MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION CONTRACTS},
  author={Richard A. Lambert and David F. Larcker},
  journal={Journal of Accounting Research},
  year={1987},
  volume={25},
  pages={85-129}
}
Prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects.' However, one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross-sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts.2 This absence is related, in part, to the problems associated with controlling for "other factors" that affect compensation. That is, compensation contracts are 
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