Corpus ID: 229152889

AIR-FI: Generating Covert Wi-Fi Signals from Air-Gapped Computers

  title={AIR-FI: Generating Covert Wi-Fi Signals from Air-Gapped Computers},
  author={Mordechai Guri},
In this paper, we show that attackers can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers via Wi-Fi signals. Malware in a compromised air-gapped computer can generate signals in the Wi-Fi frequency bands. The signals are generated through the memory buses - no special hardware is required. Sensitive data can be modulated and secretly exfiltrated on top of the signals. We show that nearby Wi-Fi capable devices (e.g., smartphones, laptops, IoT devices) can intercept these signals, decode them, and send… Expand


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HOTSPOT: Crossing the Air-Gap Between Isolated PCs and Nearby Smartphones Using Temperature
  • Mordechai Guri
  • Computer Science
  • 2019 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (EISIC)
  • 2019
The results show that it possible to send covert signals from air-gapped PCs to the attacker on the Internet through the thermal pings, and propose countermeasures for this type of covert channel which has thus far been overlooked. Expand
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USBee: Air-gap covert-channel via electromagnetic emission from USB
It is demonstrated how a software can intentionally generate controlled electromagnetic emissions from the data bus of a USB connector, and it is shown that the emitted RF signals can be controlled and modulated with arbitrary binary data. Expand
CD-LEAK: Leaking Secrets from Audioless Air-Gapped Computers Using Covert Acoustic Signals from CD/DVD Drives
  • Mordechai Guri
  • Computer Science
  • 2020 IEEE 44th Annual Computers, Software, and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)
  • 2020
This paper presents CD-LEAK - a novel acoustic covert channel that works in constrained environments where loudspeakers are not available to the attacker, and develops a transmitter and receiver for PCs and smartphones. Expand
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It is shown how attackers can covertly leak sensitive data from air-gapped networks via the row of status LEDs on networking equipment such as LAN switches and routers through different modulation and encoding schemas, along with a transmission protocol. Expand
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In this work, we study the ability for malware to leak sensitive information from an air-gapped high-security system to systems on a low-security network, using ultrasonic and audible audio covertExpand