Corpus ID: 235422185

A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges

  title={A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges},
  author={Liying Zhou and Kaihua Qin and Arthur Gervais},
The asset trading volume on blockchain-based exchanges (DEX) increased substantially since the advent of Automated Market Makers (AMM). Yet, AMMs and their forks compete on the same blockchain, incurring unnecessary network and block-space overhead, by attracting sandwich attackers and arbitrage competitions. Moreover, conceptually speaking, a blockchain is one database, and we find little reason to partition this database into multiple competing exchanges, which then necessarily require price… Expand
SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) protocols
This work establishes a general AMM framework describing the economics and formalizing the system’s state-space representation, and systematically compare the top AMM protocols’ mechanics, deriving their slippage and divergence loss functions. Expand
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High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain Exchanges
This work formalizes, analytically exposit and empirically evaluate an augmented variant of front-running: sandwich attacks, which involve front- and back-running victim transactions on a blockchain-based DEX, and quantifies the probability of an adversarial trader being able to undertake the attack, based on the relative positioning of a transaction within a blockchain block. Expand
SoK: Off The Chain Transactions
The Systematization of Knowledge is the first to structure the complete rich and multifaceted body of research on layer-two transactions, and shows that layer- two can scale blockchains, and that privacy of layer-Two transaction is not granted by default; and that fees depend on the transmitted transaction value. Expand
SoK: Transparent Dishonesty: Front-Running Attacks on Blockchain
This paper draws from a scattered body of knowledge and instances of front-running across the top 25 most active decentral applications (DApps) deployed on Ethereum blockchain and maps the proposed solutions to back-running into useful categories. Expand
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This paper investigates two methods that allow us to automatically create profitable DeFi trades, one well-suited to arbitrage and the other applicable to more complicated settings, and quantifies the value threshold at which a profitable transaction qualifies as Miner Extractable Value (MEV) and would incentivize MEV-aware miners to fork the blockchain. Expand
Do you Need a Blockchain?
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  • Business, Computer Science
  • 2018 Crypto Valley Conference on Blockchain Technology (CVCBT)
  • 2018
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