A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria

@inproceedings{Camera2014ATA,
  title={A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria},
  author={Gabriele Camera and Andrea Karina Gioffr{\'e}},
  year={2014}
}
This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punishment that, used together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-form expressions for continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This allows a transparent characterization of the dynamic incentives created by contagious punishment schemes. 
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