A theory of school‐choice lotteries

  title={A theory of school‐choice lotteries},
  author={Onur Kesten and M. {\"U}nver},
  journal={Theoretical Economics},
  • Onur Kesten, M. Ünver
  • Published 2015
  • Economics
  • Theoretical Economics
  • A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district school-choice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others, over the mechanisms it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex-ante notions of fairness in lottery design, strong ex-ante stability and ex-ante stability. This frame- work generalizes known one-to… CONTINUE READING
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