Corpus ID: 14274593

A subjective theory of compound lotteries

@inproceedings{Ergin2003AST,
  title={A subjective theory of compound lotteries},
  author={H. Ergin and Faruk Gul},
  year={2003}
}
We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on different issues. Hence, we establish subjective foundations for the Anscombe-Aumann framework and other models with two different types of probabilities. We define second-order risk as risk that resolves… Expand
76 Citations
A two-parameter model of dispersion aversion
  • 20
  • PDF
Are Universal Preferences Possible? Calibration Results for Non-Expected Utility Theories
  • 8
  • Highly Influenced
  • PDF
Uncertainty and Compound Lotteries: Calibration1
  • 1
  • Highly Influenced
A simplified axiomatic approach to ambiguity aversion
  • 83
  • PDF
Risk, ambiguity, and state-preference theory
  • 17
  • PDF
Subjective Beliefs and Ex Ante Trade
  • 93
  • Highly Influenced
Boolean Representations of Preferences under Ambiguity
  • 4
  • PDF
2 Beliefs and Convex Preferences 2 . 1 Convex Preferences
  • Highly Influenced
  • PDF
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 20 REFERENCES
The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach
  • 397
  • Highly Influential
  • PDF
A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
  • 1,097
The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
  • 2,094
  • PDF
Two Stage Lotteries Without the Reduction Axiom
  • 347
  • PDF
Uncertainty aversion with second-order probabilities and utilities
  • 37
  • Highly Influential
  • PDF
A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
  • 516
  • Highly Influential
Subjective Probabilities on Subjectively Unambiguous Events
  • 242
  • Highly Influential
  • PDF
Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative Foundation
  • 484
  • PDF
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory
  • 1,637
  • Highly Influential
  • PDF
Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities
  • 777
  • PDF
...
1
2
...