A study on bribery networks with a focus on harassment bribery and ways to control corruption
@inproceedings{Pramanik2022ASO,
title={A study on bribery networks with a focus on harassment bribery and ways to control corruption},
author={Chanchal Pramanik},
year={2022}
}The paper focuses on the bribery network emphasizing harassment bribery. A bribery network ends with the police officer whose utility from the bribe is positive and the approving officer in the network. The persistent nature of corruption is due to colluding behavior of the bribery networks. The probability of detection of bribery incidents will help in improving controlling corruption in society. The asymmetric form of punishment and award equivalent to the amount of punishment to the network…
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