A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

  title={A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game},
  author={M. Nowak and K. Sigmund},
THE Prisoner's Dilemma is the leading metaphor for the evolution of cooperative behaviour in populations of selfish agents, especially since the well-known computer tournaments of Axelrod1 and their application to biological communities2,3. In Axelrod's simulations, the simple strategy tit-for-tat did outstandingly well and subsequently became the major paradigm for reciprocal altruism4 12. Here we present extended evolutionary simulations of heterogeneous ensembles of probabilistic strategies… Expand
A strategy of No-Tricks that sets the stage for unconditional cooperators in Prisoner’s Dilemma
The evolution of strategic cooperation between competitive countries in international relations may be effectively modeled by the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) might beExpand
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Is Tit-for-Tat the Answer? On the Conclusions Drawn from Axelrod's Tournaments
It is argued that the generality of the results and the policy implications drawn from them are in doubt because the efficacy of tit-for-tat is contingent on the design of the tournament, the criterion used to determine success, and the particular values chosen for the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix. Expand
Evolution of repeated prisoner's dilemma play under logit dynamics
In an evolutionary set-up, we append an ecology of iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game strategies, consisting of unconditional cooperators (AllC), unconditional defectors (AllD) and reactiveExpand
Whence tit-for-tat?
T tit-for-tat could be important in nature for cognitively simple organisms of limited memory capacity, in strongly kin-selected or group-selected populations, when interaction sequences between individuals are relatively short, in moderate-sized populations of widely interacting individuals and when defectors appear in the population with moderate frequency. Expand
Are there really no evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma?
It is shown that when e is sufficiently small, exactly three one-move memory ESSs exist in S, and it is proved that X is an ESS in S if and only if X is a Nash equilibrium in the set consisting of only S's boundary strategies. Expand
A New Type of Evolutionary Strategy Based on a Multi-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Abstract According to the philosophy of self-cultivation that “one should refine his personal virtue when in poverty, and help save the world when in success”, a new type of evolutionary strategy,Expand
On some winning strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma or Mr. Nice Guy and the Cosa Nostra
It is shown that the general problem of recognizing stealth colluding strategies is undecidable in the theoretical sense and it will be unavoidable that group strategies will dominate all future iterated prisoner's dilemma competitions as they can be stealthy camouflaged as non-group strategies with arbitrary subtlety. Expand


Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
THE 'iterated prisoner's dilemma' is now the orthodox paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals. This viewpoint is strongly supported by Axelrod's computer tournaments,Expand
TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation
Using a system of mirrors, single three-spined sticklebacks approaching a live predator were provided with either a simulated cooperating companion or a simulated defecting one supporting the hypothesis that cooperation can evolve among egoists. Expand
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
A knowledge of the conditions under which natural selection can favour cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals is crucial for understanding the evolution of social behaviour, particularlyExpand
Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game.
  • R. Boyd
  • Economics, Medicine
  • Journal of theoretical biology
  • 1989
It is shown that if there is always some probability that individuals will make a mistake, then a pure strategy can be evolutionarily stable provided that it is "strong perfect equilibria" against itself. Expand
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
MUCH attention has been given to the Prisoners' Dilemma as a metaphor for the problems surrounding the evolution of coopera-tive behaviour1–6. This work has dealt with the relative merits of variousExpand
Chaos and the evolution of cooperation.
  • M. Nowak, K. Sigmund
  • Biology, Medicine
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  • 1993
Here it is shown that a heterogeneous population consisting of simple strategies, whose behavior is totally specified by the outcome of the previous round, can lead to persistent periodic or highly irregular oscillations in the frequencies of the strategies and the overall level of cooperation. Expand
Evolution and the Theory of Games
  • J. M. Smith
  • Sociology, Computer Science
  • American scientist
  • 1976
It is beginning to become clear that a range of problems in evolution theory can most appropriately be attacked by a modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts. Expand
Mutual Restraint in Tree Swallows: A Test of the TIT FOR TAT Model of Reciprocity
The TIT FOR TAT model of reciprocity, which is based on a successful program for the game known as the Prisoner's Dilemma, was experimentally tested on a population of tree swallows and found parents behaved as predicted by the model. Expand
The Evolution of Cooperation
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on aExpand
The Further Evolution of Cooperation
Empirical andoretical work has led to a deeper understanding of the role of other factors in the evolution of cooperation: the number of players, the range of possible choices, variation in the payoff structure, noise, the shadow of the future, population dynamics, and population structure. Expand