A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

@article{Nowak1993ASO,
  title={A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game},
  author={M. Nowak and K. Sigmund},
  journal={Nature},
  year={1993},
  volume={364},
  pages={56-58}
}
  • M. Nowak, K. Sigmund
  • Published 1993
  • Economics, Medicine
  • Nature
  • THE Prisoner's Dilemma is the leading metaphor for the evolution of cooperative behaviour in populations of selfish agents, especially since the well-known computer tournaments of Axelrod1 and their application to biological communities2,3. In Axelrod's simulations, the simple strategy tit-for-tat did outstandingly well and subsequently became the major paradigm for reciprocal altruism4 12. Here we present extended evolutionary simulations of heterogeneous ensembles of probabilistic strategies… CONTINUE READING
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