A socially enforced signal of quality in a paper wasp

@article{Tibbetts2004ASE,
  title={A socially enforced signal of quality in a paper wasp},
  author={E. Tibbetts and J. Dale},
  journal={Nature},
  year={2004},
  volume={432},
  pages={218-222}
}
Organisms use signals of quality to communicate information about aspects of their relative phenotypic and genetic constitution. Badges of status are a subset of signals of quality that reveal information about an individual's size and dominance. In general, signals of quality require high and differential costs to remain honest (that is, prevent low-quality cheaters from exploiting any fitness benefits associated with communicating high quality). The theoretically required costs for badges of… Expand
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