A socially enforced signal of quality in a paper wasp

  title={A socially enforced signal of quality in a paper wasp},
  author={Elizabeth A. Tibbetts and James Dale},
Organisms use signals of quality to communicate information about aspects of their relative phenotypic and genetic constitution. Badges of status are a subset of signals of quality that reveal information about an individual's size and dominance. In general, signals of quality require high and differential costs to remain honest (that is, prevent low-quality cheaters from exploiting any fitness benefits associated with communicating high quality). The theoretically required costs for badges of… 
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    Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
  • 2008
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    Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
  • 1988
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    Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
  • 2002
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