A simple procedure for computing strong constrained egalitarian allocations ∗

@inproceedings{Llerena2008ASP,
  title={A simple procedure for computing strong constrained egalitarian allocations ∗},
  author={Francesc Llerena and Carles Rafels and Cori Vilella},
  year={2008}
}
This paper deals with the strong constrained egalitarian solution introduced by Dutta and Ray (1991). We show that this solution yields the weak constrained egalitarian allocations (Dutta and Ray, 1989) associated to a finite family of convex games. This relationship makes it possible to define a systematic way of computing the strong constrained egalitarian allocations for any arbitrary game, using the well-known Dutta-Ray’s algorithm for convex games. We also characterize non-emptiness and… CONTINUE READING

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