A simple characterization of majority rule

@article{Campbell2000ASC,
  title={A simple characterization of majority rule},
  author={D. E. Campbell and J. Kelly},
  journal={Economic Theory},
  year={2000},
  volume={15},
  pages={689-700}
}
Summary. Assuming an odd number of voters, E. S. Maskin recently provided a characterization of majority rule based on full transitivity. This paper characterizes majority rule with a set of axioms that includes two of Maskin's, dispenses with another, and contains weak versions of his other two axioms. It allows the number of voters to be odd or even. 
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