A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.

@article{ORegan2001ASA,
  title={A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.},
  author={J. Kevin O'Regan and Alva No{\"e}},
  journal={The Behavioral and brain sciences},
  year={2001},
  volume={24 5},
  pages={
          939-73; discussion 973-1031
        }
}
  • J. O'Regan, A. Noë
  • Published 2001
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • The Behavioral and brain sciences
Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose… Expand
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