A sensitive virtue epistemology

  title={A sensitive virtue epistemology},
  author={Anthony Bolos and James Henry Collin},
We offer an alternative to two influential accounts of virtue epistemology: Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE). We argue that while traditional RVE does offer an explanation of the distinctive value of knowledge, it is unable to effectively deal with cases of epistemic luck; and while ALVE does effectively deal with cases of epistemic luck, it lacks RVE’s resources to account for the distinctive value of knowledge. The account we provide, however, is both… Expand

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