A reputation-based contract for repeated crowdsensing with costly verification

@article{Dobakhshari2017ARC,
  title={A reputation-based contract for repeated crowdsensing with costly verification},
  author={Donya Ghavidel Dobakhshari and Parinaz Naghizadeh Ardabili and M. Liu and Vijay Gupta},
  journal={2017 American Control Conference (ACC)},
  year={2017},
  pages={5243-5248}
}
We study a setup in which a system operator hires a sensor to exert costly effort to collect accurate measurements of a value of interest over time. At each time, the sensor is asked to report his observation to the operator, and is compensated based on the accuracy of this observation. Since both the effort and observation are private information for the sensor, a naive payment scheme which compensates the sensor based only on his self-reported values will lead to both shirking and… Expand
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This paper designs an appropriate compensation scheme to incentivize the sensors to both exert costly effort and then reveal the resulting observation truthfully and proposes a compensation scheme that employs stochastic verification by the operator coupled with an algorithm to assign a reputation to each sensor. Expand
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