A refutation of Penrose's Gödelian case against artificial intelligence

  title={A refutation of Penrose's G{\"o}delian case against artificial intelligence},
  author={Selmer Bringsjord and Hong Xiao},
  journal={Journal of Experimental \& Theoretical Artificial Intelligence},
  pages={307 - 329}
Having, as it is generally agreed, failed to destroy the computational conception of mind with the Godelian attack he articulated in his The Emperor's New Mind, Penrose has returned, armed with a more elaborate and more fastidious Gödelian case, expressed in Chapters 2 and 3 of his Shadows of the Mind. The core argument in these chapters is enthymematic, and when formalized, a remarkable number of technical glitches come to light. Over and above these defects, the argument, at best, is an… 

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