A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality

@article{Mossel2012AQG,
  title={A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality},
  author={Elchanan Mossel and Mikl{\'o}s Z. R{\'a}cz},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2012},
  volume={abs/1110.5888}
}
Recently, quantitative versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem were proven for k=3 alternatives by Friedgut, Kalai, Keller and Nisan and for neutral functions on k ≥ 4 alternatives by Isaksson, Kindler and Mossel. In the present paper we prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for general social choice functions for any number k ≥ 3 of alternatives. In particular we show that for a social choice function f on k ≥ 3 alternatives and n voters, which is ε-far from… Expand
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