# A proof of the impossibility of inductive probability

```@article{Popper1983APO,
title={A proof of the impossibility of inductive probability},
author={K. Popper and David Miller},
journal={Nature},
year={1983},
volume={302},
pages={687-688}
}```
• Published 1983
• Philosophy
• Nature
Proofs of the impossibility of induction have been falling ‘dead-born from the Press’ ever since the first of them (in David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature) appeared in 1739. One of us (K.P.) has been producing them for more than 50 years. The present proof strikes us both as pretty.
155 Citations
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• Computer Science, Mathematics
• WCII
• 2002
How the maxent paradigm may be used to produce an inductive method applicable to a wide class of problems in inductive logic, and whether the answers it gives are consistent with, or explicable by, the existence of underlying reasons for the given knowledge base. Expand
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