A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.

  title={A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.},
  author={Daniel Kahneman},
  journal={The American psychologist},
  volume={58 9},
  • D. Kahneman
  • Published 1 September 2003
  • Psychology
  • The American psychologist
Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute… 
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