A perception-action model for empathy

  title={A perception-action model for empathy},
  author={Stephanie D. Preston},
23.1 IntroductionT his chapter describes an d au gm en ts the perception -action m odel(P A M ) of em pa-thy,firstdetailed in P reston an d de W aal(2002b).E m pathy,iron ically,is a term thatm ean s differen tthin gs to differen tpeople.Ithas been difficu ltto distin gu ish em pathyfrom sym pathy becau se they both in volve the em otion al state of on e related to thestate ofan other.T his problem w as com pou n ded by the fact that the m apping oftheterm s has recen tly reversed:w hat is n ow… 
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  • M. Rosekrans
  • Psychology
    Journal of personality and social psychology
  • 1967
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