A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

@article{Dardanoni2001APP,
  title={A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem},
  author={V. Dardanoni},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2001},
  volume={18},
  pages={107-112}
}
  • V. Dardanoni
  • Published 2001
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Social Choice and Welfare
Abstract. In this note I consider a simple proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 1963). I start with the case of three individuals who have preferences on three alternatives. In this special case there are 133=2197 possible combinations of the three individuals' rational preferences. However, by considering the subset of linear preferences, and employing the full strength of the IIA axiom, I reduce the number of cases necessary to completely describe the SWF to a small number, allowing… Expand
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