A one-shot proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem

@article{Yu2012AOP,
  title={A one-shot proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem},
  author={Ning Neil Yu},
  journal={Economic Theory},
  year={2012},
  volume={50},
  pages={523-525}
}
We offer a new proof of the well-known Arrow’s impossibility theorem. The proof is simple, very short and it follows from the assumptions in a transparent way. 
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