A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests

@article{Wasser2013ANO,
  title={A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests},
  author={C{\'e}dric Wasser},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
  year={2013},
  volume={66},
  pages={180-182}
}
The literature on imperfectly discriminating contests has almost exclusively focused on complete information. We study such contests assuming players have private information. We identify a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests for which findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. The main assumptions are that a player’s valuation of winning is increasing in the signal he observes and that a player’s probability of… CONTINUE READING

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