A norm knockout method on indirect reciprocity to reveal indispensable norms

@article{Yamamoto2017ANK,
  title={A norm knockout method on indirect reciprocity to reveal indispensable norms},
  author={Hitoshi Yamamoto and Isamu Okada and Satoshi Uchida and Tatsuya Sasaki},
  journal={Scientific Reports},
  year={2017},
  volume={7}
}
Although various norms for reciprocity-based cooperation have been suggested that are evolutionarily stable against invasion from free riders, the process of alternation of norms and the role of diversified norms remain unclear in the evolution of cooperation. We clarify the co-evolutionary dynamics of norms and cooperation in indirect reciprocity and also identify the indispensable norms for the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by the gene knockout method, a genetic engineering technique, we… 
Justified defection is neither justified nor unjustified in indirect reciprocity
TLDR
The results indicate the necessity to reconsider the justification of “justified defection” in the evolution of cooperation and reveal what kind of norms are adopted by people in indirect reciprocal situations in daily life in indirect reciprocity.
A Theoretical Approach to Norm Ecosystems: Two Adaptive Architectures of Indirect Reciprocity Show Different Paths to the Evolution of Cooperation
TLDR
Impacts of different adaptive architectures, i.e., ways for individuals to adapt to environments, on indirect reciprocity are investigated and an analytic method is proposed to study norm ecosystems in which all possible second order social norms potentially exist and compete.
The Evolution of Morals Under Indirect Reciprocity
TLDR
There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs involving two strategies and one for higher CBR's which involves two additional strategies.
The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity
TLDR
A synthesis of theoretical models is provided and previous conclusions through the lens of evolutionary game theory and cognitive complexity are discussed, suggesting that costly reputation spread, interaction observability and empathy are determinants of cooperation under IR.
A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity
TLDR
Indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms are introduced.
Tit for Tat: Cooperation, communication, and how each could stabilize the other
TLDR
The conditions are that individuals can signal about who is truthful, requiring a vital conceptual slippage between cooperation/defection and truthfulness/deceit, and make occasional mistakes, demonstrating how error can create stability by expressing unexpressed genes.
Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity
TLDR
This analysis shows that the use of the stern-judging rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability and can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule.
Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory
TLDR
A theoretical way for peer punishment to work as a solution mechanism for the dilemma by incorporating prospect theory into evolutionary game theory is proposed and it is shown that the cooperative state achieved by this mechanism is globally stable as well as evolutionarily stable in a wide range of parameter values.
Effect of voluntary participation on an alternating and a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma.
TLDR
A model that consists of all possible strategies using a one-period memory of past actions is developed, which enables us to analyze a "melting pot" of strategies, wherein several strategies interact and compete with each other.
...
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 44 REFERENCES
Stern-Judging: A Simple, Successful Norm Which Promotes Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity
TLDR
The lack of ambiguity of stern-judging, where implacable punishment is compensated by prompt forgiving, supports the idea that simplicity is often associated with evolutionary success.
The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity
TLDR
This work proposes a new simple norm called “Staying” that prescribes abstaining from assessment and demonstrates that Staying is most effective in establishing cooperation compared to the prevailing social norms, which rely on constant monitoring and unconditional assessment.
Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies
TLDR
The stochastic dynamics of cooperation under distinct social norms are studied, showing that the leading norms capable of promoting cooperation depend on the community size and only a single norm systematically leads to the highest cooperative standards in small communities.
The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity
Richard Alexander has argued that moral systems derive from indirect reciprocity. We analyse a simple case of a model of indirect reciprocity based on image scoring. Discriminators provide help to
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
TLDR
It is proposed that the emergence of indirect reciprocity was a decisive step for the evolution of human societies and the probability of knowing the ‘image’ of the recipient must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act.
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
TLDR
It is shown that the threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory, and that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem.
...
...