A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. Part 1: Semantics and logic of simple conditionals

@inproceedings{Rott1989ANC,
  title={A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. Part 1: Semantics and logic of simple conditionals},
  author={Hans Rott},
  booktitle={The Logic of Theory Change},
  year={1989}
}
  • H. Rott
  • Published in The Logic of Theory Change 13 October 1989
  • Philosophy
Using Gardenfors's notion of epistemic entrenchment, we develop the semantics of a logic which accounts for the following points. It explains why we may generally infer If ⌍A then B if all we know is A∨B while must not generally infer If ⌍A then B if all we know is {A∨B,A}. More generally, it explains the nonmonotonic nature of the consequence relation governing languages which contain conditionals, and it explains how we can deduce conditionals from premise sets without conditionals. Depending… 
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