A new old solution for weak tournaments

  title={A new old solution for weak tournaments},
  author={Vincent Anesi},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the tournament game introduced by Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1993) [The bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 182-201]. The exploration of a speci c class of Markov perfect… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.


Publications citing this paper.
Showing 1-4 of 4 extracted citations


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 25 references

The simplest equilibrium of a majority rule game

D. P. Baron, E. Kalai
Journal of Economic Theory • 1993
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Satis cing and Selection in Electoral Competition

J. Bendor, D. Mookherjee, D. Ray
Quarterly Journal of Political Science • 2006
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game

G. La ond, Laslier, J.-F, M. Le Breton
Games and Economic Behavior • 1993
View 3 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions

Mathematical Social Sciences • 2009
View 2 Excerpts

A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces

J. S. Banks, J. Duggan
Quarterly Journal of Political Science • 2008

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…