A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

@article{Adachi2014ANM,
  title={A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites},
  author={Tsuyoshi Adachi},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2014},
  volume={87},
  pages={508-518}
}
We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete informational, with no simultaneous moves (i.e., it is solvable by backward induction), which implements the socially optimal ranking with subgame perfect equilibria. 

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