A minimax procedure for electing committees

@article{Brams2007AMP,
  title={A minimax procedure for electing committees},
  author={Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour and M. Remzi Sanver},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={2007},
  volume={132},
  pages={401-420}
}
Abstract A new voting procedure for electing committees, called the minimax procedure, is described. Based on approval balloting, it chooses the committee that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance to voters’ ballots, where these ballots are weighted by their proximity to other voters’ ballots. This minimax outcome may be diametrically opposed to the outcome obtained by aggregating approval votes in the usual manner, which minimizes the sum of the Hamming distances and is called the minisum… 
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