• Corpus ID: 235254680

A mechanism of Individualistic Indirect Reciprocity with internal and external dynamics

  title={A mechanism of Individualistic Indirect Reciprocity with internal and external dynamics},
  author={Mario Ignacio Gonz'alez Silva and Ricardo Silva and H'ector Alfonso Ju'arez L'opez and Antonio Aguilera Ontiveros},
The cooperation mechanism of indirect reciprocity has been studied by making multiple variations of its parts. This research proposes a new variant of Nowak and Sigmund model, focused on agents’ attitude; it is called Individualistic Indirect Reciprocity. In our model, an agent reinforces its strategy to the extent to which it makes a profit. We also include conditions related to the environment, visibility of agents, cooperation demand, and the attitude of an agent to maintain his cooperation… 

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