A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation

  title={A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation},
  author={Franz Dietrich and Christian List},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
In the emerging literature on judgment (as opposed to preference) aggregation, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. When a group forms collective beliefs, it may assign group members with expert knowledge on certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions; and, when a group forms collective goals or desires, it may assign members specially affected by certain propositions similar rights on those propositions. We identify a… CONTINUE READING

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