A higher-order solution to the problem of the concept horse

  title={A higher-order solution to the problem of the concept horse},
  author={Nicholas K. Jones},
  journal={Open Access Journal},
This paper uses the resources of higher-order logic to articulate a Fregean conception of predicate reference, and of word-world relations more generally, that is immune to the concept horse problem. A prominent style of expressibility problem for views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Linnebo, Hale, and Wright, is then addressed. Central to an account of the relationship between language and reality is an account of that between predicates and reality. Frege’s problem of the… Expand
  • A. Klev
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • 2017
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