A gap in Nisbett and Wilson’s findings? A first-person access to our cognitive processes

  title={A gap in Nisbett and Wilson’s findings? A first-person access to our cognitive processes},
  author={Claire Peugeot Petitmengin and Anne Remillieux and B{\'e}atrice Cahour and Shirley Carter-Thomas},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},
The well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson lead to the conclusion that we have no introspective access to our decision-making processes. Johansson et al. have recently developed an original protocol consisting in manipulating covertly the relationship between the subjects' intended choice and the outcome they were presented with: in 79.6% of cases, they do not detect the manipulation and provide an explanation of the choice they did not make, confirming the findings of Nisbett and Wilson… 

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