A fundamental Game Theoretic model and approximate global Nash Equilibria computation for European Spot Power Markets

  title={A fundamental Game Theoretic model and approximate global Nash Equilibria computation for European Spot Power Markets},
  author={Ioan Alexandru Puiu and Raphael Andreas Hauser},
Spot electricity markets are considered under a Game-Theoretic framework, where risk averse players submit orders to the market clearing mechanism to maximise their own utility. Consistent with the current practice in Europe, the market clearing mechanism is modelled as a Social Welfare Maximisation problem, with zonal pricing, and we consider inflexible demand, physical constraints of the electricity grid, and capacity-constrained producers. A novel type of non-parametric risk aversion based on… 

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