A dynamic model of social network formation.

@article{Skyrms2000ADM,
  title={A dynamic model of social network formation.},
  author={Brian Skyrms and Robin Pemantle},
  journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America},
  year={2000},
  volume={97 16},
  pages={
          9340-6
        }
}
  • B. Skyrms, R. Pemantle
  • Published 1 August 2000
  • Economics
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The game payoffs determine which interactions are reinforced, and the network structure emerges as a consequence of the dynamics of the agents' learning behavior. We study this in a variety of game-theoretic conditions and show that the behavior is complex and… 
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