A deflationary theory of reference

@article{Bve2008ADT,
  title={A deflationary theory of reference},
  author={Arvid B{\aa}ve},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2008},
  volume={169},
  pages={51-73}
}
  • A. Båve
  • Published 1 July 2009
  • Philosophy
  • Synthese
The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S… 

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