A defence of the Via Negativa argument for physicalism

@article{Montero2005ADO,
  title={A defence of the Via Negativa argument for physicalism},
  author={Barbara Gail Montero and David Papineau},
  journal={Analysis},
  year={2005},
  volume={65},
  pages={233-237}
}
Given this premiss, and assuming the implausibility of systematic causal overdetermination, it follows that everything that has a physical effect must itself be physical. However, what does 'physical' mean in this context? Defenders of CP face Hempel's Dilemma: if 'physical' means what is recognized by current physics, then CP is likely to be false, for historical form suggests that future research will substantially correct the ontology of current physics; on the other hand, if 'physical' is… 
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