A decent proposal

@inproceedings{Corchn2004ADP,
  title={A decent proposal},
  author={Luis C. Corch{\'o}n and Carmen Herrero},
  year={2004}
}
In this paper we explore the notion that players are “decent” in the sense that their choices are bounded by certain unwritten social rules. We apply this idea to problems of Bankruptcy and Implementation. JEL Classification: D78, D63 

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