A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities

@article{Balbus2014ACS,
  title={A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities},
  author={Lukasz Balbus and Kevin L. Reffett and Lukasz Wozny},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
  year={2014},
  volume={150},
  pages={815-840}
}
We study a class of infinite horizon, discounted stochastic games with strategic complementarities. In our class of games, we prove the existence of a Stationary Markov Nash equilibrium, as well as provide methods for constructing this least and greatest equilibrium via a successive approximation scheme. We also provide equilibrium monotone comparative statics results relative to ordered perturbations of the space of stochastic games. Under slightly stronger assumptions, we prove the stationary… CONTINUE READING

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