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A connectionist defence of the inscrutability thesis and the elimination of the mental

  title={A connectionist defence of the inscrutability thesis and the elimination of the mental},
  author={C Garz{\'o}n and Francisco José},
This work consists of two parts. In Part I (chapters 1-5), I shall produce a Connectionist Defence of Quine's Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference, according to which there is no objective fact of the matter as to what the ontological commitments of the speakers of a language are. I shall start by reviewing Quine's project in his original behaviouristic setting. Chapters 1, and 2 will be devoted to addressing several criticisms that Gareth Evans, and Crispin Wright, have put forward on… 
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This paper consists of four parts. In section 1, I shall offer a strategy to bypass a counter-example which Gareth Evans (1975) offers against Quine’s Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. In
  • M. Gardner
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    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1973
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