A concise proof of theorem on manipulation of social choice functions

  title={A concise proof of theorem on manipulation of social choice functions},
  author={Peter G{\"a}rdenfors},
  journal={Public Choice},
Political scientists have for a long time been aware of the fact that most social choice methods used in practice are subject to strategic manipulation in the sense that an individual (or a group of individual), by misrepresenting his preferences, may secure an outcome he prefers to the outcome which would have obtained if he had expressed his sincere preferences. However, when K. Arrow/l/ made the study of social welfare functions a respectable branch of science he deliberately avoided the… 
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