A commitment folk theorem

@article{Kalai2010ACF,
  title={A commitment folk theorem},
  author={Adam Tauman Kalai and Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer and Dov Samet},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2010},
  volume={69},
  pages={127-137}
}
Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further benefit from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. This paper proposes a model of conditional commitments that unifies earlier models while avoiding circularities that often arise in such models. A commitment folk theorem shows that the potential of voluntary conditional commitments is essentially… CONTINUE READING

Figures and Topics from this paper.

Explore Further: Topics Discussed in This Paper

Citations

Publications citing this paper.
SHOWING 1-10 OF 41 CITATIONS

A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment

  • Games and Economic Behavior
  • 2013
VIEW 27 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND & METHODS
HIGHLY INFLUENCED

Bayesian games with contracts

VIEW 27 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND, RESULTS & METHODS
HIGHLY INFLUENCED

A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication

VIEW 10 EXCERPTS
CITES RESULTS, BACKGROUND & METHODS
HIGHLY INFLUENCED

Folk theorems for Bayesian ( public good ) games

VIEW 5 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND
HIGHLY INFLUENCED

Regular Equilibria and Negative Welfare Implications in Delegation Games

VIEW 3 EXCERPTS
CITES RESULTS & BACKGROUND
HIGHLY INFLUENCED

Bayesian repeated games and reputation

  • J. Economic Theory
  • 2015
VIEW 5 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND
HIGHLY INFLUENCED

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games

VIEW 4 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND
HIGHLY INFLUENCED

Reciprocal contracting

  • J. Economic Theory
  • 2015
VIEW 5 EXCERPTS
CITES BACKGROUND & METHODS
HIGHLY INFLUENCED