A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria

  title={A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria},
  author={Robert W. Rosenthal},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  • R. Rosenthal
  • Published 1 December 1973
  • Economics
  • International Journal of Game Theory
A class of noncooperative games (of interest in certain applications) is described. Each game in the class is shown to possess at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 

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